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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Insane Persons-Guardianship-Restoration to Sanity After
In re Wilson
In In re Wilson1 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
permanent commitment to a mental hospital without proper notice
and hearing is a violation of due process.2 In addition the court,
by way of dictum, placed a construction on the North Carolina in-
voluntary commitment and guardianship procedure which is the
subject of consideration here.
The North Carolina procedure for involuntary commitment or
hospitalization of insane persons is contained in Chapter 122 of the
General Statutes. Section 122-46' authorizes the clerk of the
superior court to hold an informal hearing upon the certification of
two physicians that a person is in need of observation. At this hear-
ing, which is preceded by notice to the allegedly deranged person,
the clerk must examine any proper witnesses and the certificates and
affidavits of the physicians. He may then issue an order of com-
mitment for an observation period not exceeding sixty days.4 If this
period should prove to be insufficient, the clerk may order the person
to remain at the hospital for another observation period not exceeding
four months.5 When the observation is completed, the hospital
authorities must file with the clerk a written report stating their
conclusions as to the patient's sanity. Upon the basis of this report
the clerk may either order the person discharged or committed in-
determinately, as the facts may warrant.' The subsequent discharge
of a person indeterminately committed is upon certification by the
superintendent of the hospital that the patient has regained his
sanity.
7
The guardianship statutes, quite distinct from the commitment
procedure, are contained in Chapter 35. Mental incapacity" is the
-257 N.C. 593, 126 S.E.2d 489 (1962).
2 This note should be read in connection with Note, 41 N.C.L. Rzv. 141
(1962) which discusses the constitutional issues involved in this case.8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-46 (Supp. 1961).
'If a person committed is found not to be mentally disordered the super-
intendent must immediately report this to the clerk who shall order his
discharge. Ibid.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961).
I1bid.
TN.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-66.1 (1958).
Mental incapacity is the inability to legally manage and understand one's
affairs. It should not be confused with the various medical terms describing
types of mental illnesses.
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only cause for appointment of a guardian under this Chapter.' Sec-
tion 35-210 requires a jury finding of insanity before the clerk is
authorized to appoint a guardian for one not confined in an institu-
tion. "Restoration to sanity"" for such person is also by jury trial
under G.S. § 35412 upon the filing of a petition in his behalf.
- The certificate of the superintendent of a mental hospital declaring
a patient already committed to be insane is sufficient evidence to
authorize the clerk to appoint a guardian.3 A certificate from the
superintendent may also restore a patient to legal sanity. 4 Upon
discharge from a mental institution the patient for whom a guardian
has been appointed may petition the clerk for the guardian's dis-
charge. 5 A hearing is then held, with or without a jury at the
petitioner's option. One or more physicians are appointed by the
clerk to examine the petitioner and make affidavits as to his mental
state. Upon a determination of legal competency the clerk must dis-
charge the guardian.
It should be noted that guardianship is not a necessary element of
commitment. The two proceedings are complete in themselves.
A person may be committed to a mental institution without the
appointment of a guardian, just as a guardian may be appointed
without commitment.
The 1957 General Assembly,. in an effort to clarify the effect of
involuntary commitment for observation under G.S. § 122-46 on
legal competency, amended the statute by adding the following
paragraph:
Neither the institution of a proceeding to have any alleged
mentally disordered person committed for observation as pro-
vided in this section nor the order of commitment by the clerk
as provided in this section shall have the effect of creating
any presumption that such person is legally incompetent for
any purpose. Provided, however, that if a guardian or trustee
has been appointed.., under G.S. 35-2 or 35-3 the procedure
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §35-2 (Supp. 1961). The adjudication of in-
competency and appointment of a guardian are merged into one finding.
"°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (Supp. 1961).
" "Restoration to sanity" is used in the statutes to mean a return to mental
capacity.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-4 (Supp. 1961),
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-3 (Supp. 1961).
'4 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-5 (Supp. 1961).
"5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-4.1 (1950).
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for restoration to sanity shall be as is now provided in G.S.
35-4 and 35-4.1. x6
It had been expressly held prior to this amendment that the pro-
cedure outlined in Chapter 35 did not apply to a person involuntarily
committed to a mental institution under G.S. § 122-46. His remedy
was by habeas corpus, not jury trial."
The construction placed on the amendment by the North Carolina
Supreme Court, however, appears to be contrary to the express
language of the statute and inconsistent with the legislative intent.
The court's dictum in the principal case reads the amendment to
provide that restoration to sanity for one committed under G.S.
§ 122-46 may be had under G.S. §§ 35-3, 35-4, and 35-4.1. They
said that "The amendment removes from G.S. § 122-46 the objection
that a traditional trial by jury is not provided as a means of de-
termining the issue of sanity. Apparently the requirement that a
guardian be appointed and made a party is to give binding effect to
an adverse verdict by the jury."'" The court said a judgment that a
person is lawfully detained and insane exceeds the scope of habeas
corpus. 9 They concluded by saying that:
As a more practical approach, however, a guardian may be
appointed upon the basis of the superintendent's certificate as
provided in G.S. 35-3. A petition, on the application of some
relative or friend, may be filed invoking the procedure under
G.S. 35-4 and have a jury pass upon Mrs. Wilson's sanity.
The guardian should be a party to the end the finding of the
jury, if adverse, may have finality until a material change in
condition occurs.20
This interpretation by the court seems to embrace procedures not
contemplated by the amendment. The basic steps suggested are
".C. GEx. STAT. § 122-46 (Supp. 1961). Prior to this amendment
there had been some confusion among members of the bar, particularly those
in title practice, as to whether commitment to a mental institution created a
presumption that the patient was incompetent, and thus incapable of disposing
of his property."it re Harris, 241 N.C. 179, 84 S.E.2d 808 (1954).
18257 N.C. at 596, 126 S.E.2d at 491.
"This is a departure from In re Harris, 241 N.C. 179, 84 S.E.2d 808
(1954). The court's reasoning seems to be that the writ of habeas corpus
can only test the legality of the petitioner's detention assuming he may be"insane. Therefore a finding that petitioner is in fact insane is beyond the
,scope of the writ and may be made only by a jury.
20 257 N.C. at 597, 126 S.E.2d at 492.
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the appointment of a guardian under G.S. § 35-3, followed by a
petition by the patient under G.S. § 35-4 asserting his competency,
thus resulting in a jury trial on the question of his sanity." Analys'is
reveals that this would not accomplish the ends anticipated by the
court. Even if the jury finds the patient competent, the guardian's
removal does not result in the patient's discharge from the hospital.
A court adjudication of incompetency is not a necessary element
for detention in a mental hospital under our statutes.2 2
The strongest argument that can be made against the court's
interpretation of the amendment, however, is that it reads into the
statute a legislative intent to import guardianship procedure into
involuntary commitment procedure, when in fact it was the intent
of the proviso within the amendment to make it clear that G.S.
§ 122-46 would have no effect on guardianship proceedings, and vice
versa.
23
Despite the confusion of the principal case, it serves to point up
two problems worthy of mention. One is the feasibility of a jury
trial in hospitalization procedures, the other the relationship between
hospitalization and guardianship or incompetency proceedings.24
The majority of jurisdictions have dispensed with jury trials in
hospitalization cases since they are not necessary for due process.2
" It is difficult to ascertain exactly what the court envisaged. The ap-
pointment of a guardian apparently is to enable the patient to invoke the
procedures under G.S. § 35-4 for restoration to competency by jury trial.
Even so, restoration under G.S. § 35-4 does not affect the patient's status
in the hospital.22N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961).
23 "I should like to state simply that the purpose of the amendment was
to clarify the law in the following particulars, to-wit: . . . (2) To make it
clear that G.S. 12246 would have no effect on guardianship proceedings, and
vice versa .... Again, I should like to state that the question of trial by
jury, the appointment of a guardian and the purpose for such appointment
was not contemplated under G.S. 122-46 by the amendment. It was the sole
specific purpose and intent of the proviso within the amendment to provide
that the procedure for the restoration to sanity for those whose cases come
within the classifications embraced in G.S. 35-2 or 35-3 would be as provided
by G.S. 35-4 and 35-4.1." Letter from Clyde A. Shreve to George C.
Cochran, August 3, 1962. Mr. Shreve was co-introducer of the amendment.
" See generally Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. Rnv.
274 (1953) ; GUTTMACHER & WEIHI0FEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952) ;
LINDMAN AND MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (1961);
Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICn.
L. REv. 945 (1959); Slovenko & Super, The Mentally Disabled, the Law,
and the Report of the American Bar Foundation, 47 VA. L. REv. 1366 (1961).
3 E.g., Clough v. Clough, 10 Colo. App. 433, 51 Pac. 513 (1897) ; People
v. Niesman, 356 Ill. 322, 190 N.E. 668 (1934) ; In re Brewer, 224 Iowa 773,
276 N.W. 766 (1937) ; Ex parte Higgins v. Hoctor, 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S.W.2d
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Contemporary writers2 6 on the subject have cited Alaska and Ken-
tucky as the only states that require a jury trial in every case; how-
ever, recent statutory changes in these two states now require a jury
trial only if requested by the patient." Thus Alaska and Kentucky
have now joined approximately- thirty per cent of the states which
provide optional jury trials.28
Admission procedures to a mental hospital should be as simple as
possible. As a means to this end authorities, both medical and legal,
have strongly urged dispensing with jury trials.29 The detrimental
effect a trial may have on a mentally unbalanced person is readily
apparent. If he is required to sit through a trial and listen to his
physician, his family, and other witnesses testify against him it may
make psychiatric treatment even more difficult.3" Also, the use of a
lay jury to determine such a highly technical question as insanity has
been compared to "calling the neighbors to diagnose meningitis or
scarlet fever."3  A paranoiac, for example, can be lucid and con-
vincing one instant and completely deranged the next. 2  The
mentally ill person is much more likely to fool a jury than an expert,
while the truly sane person should have no greater difficulty con-
vincing a judge and expert physician of his sanity than he would
a jury.
The relationship between hospitalization and incompetency differs
410 (1933); It re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904); Ex parte
Dagley, 35 Okla. 180, 128 Pac. 699 (1912). See Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v.
Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226 (1923); Montana Co. v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co.,
152 U.S. 160 (1894). Cf. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
2' See Ross, supra note 24, at 970.
m ALASKA COm. LAWS ANN. § 51-4-4 (1949) required a jury trial in
commitment proceedings. This was repealed by an Act of Congress, July 28,
1956. The proclamation issued by the Acting Governor of Alaska on June
19, 1957, made this effective July 1, 1957. The new law requires a jury
trial only upon written request at least two days prior to the hearing.
ALASKA Com. LAWS ANN. § 51-4-20h(f) (Supp. 1958). Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 202.080 (1952) required a jury trial in every case. This section was re-
pealed in 1960. Ky. Laws 1960, ch. 67, § 35. Ky. REv. STAT. § 202.140
(1962) now provides that a jury trial is still required in all instances if the
petition requests the person be adjudged incompetent.
8 For a table showing the statutory provisions as to jury trials in the
other states, see LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 58-62.
' See GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 300; LIND-
MAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 27, 41; Ross, suepra note 24, at
970.
See generally Ross, supra note 24.
81 STERN, MENTAL ILLNESS: A GUIDE FOR THE FAMILY 37 (1952).
8 See Ross, supra note 24, at 970.
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greatly.among the states.33 There is considerable controversy over
whether a person in need of confinement in a mental hospital is neces-
sarily incapable of managing his own affairs.,4 Incompetency may
bd the result of independent judicial action, as it is in North Carolina,
6r it may be one of the issues decided at a hospitalization proceeding. 5
The appointment of a guardian, however, is a consequence of an
adjudication of incompetency in North Carolina.8" The legislative
,trend appears to be toward complete separation of hospitalization
and incompetency." The Draft Act" prepared by the National Insti-
tute of Mental Health states that an order of hospitalization decides
no more than the need for hospitalization. Several states have
adopted modified versions of this act.39
The separation of the two procedures is based upon the presump-
tion that a person in need of hospitalization may still be quite capable
of handling certain of his affairs, just as an incompetent may not need
.hospitalization. In support of this view, it has been espoused that
"from a medical viewpoint, there is no necessary relationship be-
tween commitability and competency."4  Mental disabilities vary
-to such a degree that any connection between hospitalization and in-
competency seems unjustified.
FRANK W. BuLLocK, JR.
, See Ross, supra note 24, at 980-95; LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit.
supra note 24, at 220, 235-8. Hospitalization and incompetency are two
distinct legal concepts fulfilling different purposes. Although both result in
a loss of rights, hospitalization affects the person's freedom to be at large
•while incompetency results in a loss of civil rights and gives the incompetent
the legal status of a minor.
8 See Ross, supra note 24, at 980-95; LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. Cit.
sitpra note 24, at 220, 235-8.
'0 Ibid.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-2, -3 (Supp. 1961). In some of the states
'which merge hospitalization and incompetency a guardian is not always ap-
pointed. Thus the incompetent is in the position of being unable to manage
his own affairs and yet has no one to do so for him. See LINDMAN & Mc-
INTYRE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 220, 235-8.
IT See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 221.
11 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY,
A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL, SCOPE
oF THE D rAr Acr 2, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE PUB. No. 51, 1952. For a
'brief summary of the act by one of its authors, see Felix, Hospitalization of
the MentaUy Ill, 107 Am[. J. PSYCHIATRY 712 (1951). See also Ross, supra
note 24; Slovenko & Super, supra note 24.
"0 See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. ci. supra note 24, at 221; Ross, supra
note 24, at 949 n. 19, 991.' GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 339.
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